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Style Your Face Morph and Improve Your Face Morphing
Attack Detector
Clemens Seibold1, Anna Hilsmann2, Peter Eisert3
Abstract: A morphed face image is a synthetically created image that looks so similar to the faces
of two subjects that both can use it for verification against a biometric verification system. It can be
easily created by aligning and blending face images of the two subjects. In this paper, we propose
a style transfer based method that improves the quality of morphed face images. It counters the
image degeneration during the creation of morphed face images caused by blending. We analyze
different state of the art face morphing attack detection systems regarding their performance against
our improved morphed face images and other methods that improve the image quality. All detection
systems perform significantly worse, when first confronted with our improved morphed face images.
Most of them can be enhanced by adding our quality improved morphs to the training data, which
further improves the robustness against other means of quality improvement.
Keywords: biometric spoofing, face morphing detection, image quality improvement
1 Introduction
Ferarra et al. [FFM14] showed that a synthetic face image that looks similar to two dif-
ferent subjects and contains biometric characteristics of both can easily be created with
freely-available tools. Both subjects can use this image to verify their identity against a
biometric verification system. This attack is called face morphing attack. It can be per-
formed by a non-rigid alignment and blending of face images of two subjects. The sim-
plicity of this attack and the fact that an applicant for an official document like a passport
or other ID-cards can provide his/her own printed image in most European countries make
face morphing attacks a real and dangerous threat to the integrity for biometric verifica-
tion systems to border control. Therefore, the detection of such attacks is essential for the
reliability of biometric verification systems.
In [Sc19] and [MW18], an overview on the state of the art of morphing attack detection
(MAD) methods is provided. One important step in the process of creating a morphed face
image (morph) is the blending of two aligned images. During this process high frequency
details, like wrinkles, scars or pore structures are smoothed or get lost and the resulting
image appears dull. Hence, these characteristics can provide evidence for image manipu-
lations and MAD systems are likely to use these characteristics for detection.
In this paper, we present a style transfer based method that improves the image quality of
morphs and counters image degenerating effects caused by the creation process of morphs.
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Fig. 1: (a) simple morph (left half) and improved morph (right half). (b) Binarized Statistical Im-
age Features for a simple morph (top) and an improved morph (bottom). (c) visualizes two feature
maps [ZF14] in a later layer with a relative strong difference between simple and improved morph
of a DNN that was trained for MAD (top: simple morph, bottom: improved morph). The differences
are hardly recognizable in the image as well as in the feature spaces.
We show that being prepared against improved morphs is essential and considering a im-
provement method can also help to be robust against others. Our improved morphs are
more often not detected by MAD systems that were trained without knowledge of these
improved morphs, although they only differ slightly compared to simple morphs in im-
age and in feature space, see Fig.1. However, most systems can be improved by adding
style transfer based improved morphs to the data during training. In addition to robustness
against our style transfer based improved morphs, we show that training on these improved
morphs can also increase the robustness against other kinds of image quality improvement
methods like histogram equalization or sharpening filters.
The key contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a Deep Neural Network (DNN) based method that improves the quality
of morphs by countering the image degeneration caused by additive blending.
• We evaluate the vulnerability of several state of the art MAD systems against our
improvement method.
• We show that considering our improved morphs during training can improve the ro-
bustness of detection systems also against other image quality improvement meth-
ods.
In contrast to [Hi17], [SSV18] and [FFM19] who show that image degeneration operations
like adding noise, double-scaling or a print-scan process can worsen a MAD system’s per-
formance significantly and need to be considered, we improve the image quality by adapt-
ing neural style transfer and study the effects of such improvement on MAD systems.
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Fig. 2: Style transfer for the improvement of morphs.
In the next section, we provide theoretical background on style transfer and our adapta-
tion to improve the quality of morphs. We give a short description of the analyzed MAD
systems, our data sources and pre-processing in Section 3. Section 4 contains our research
questions and our experimental results.
2 Style Transfer for Morph Enhancement
Gatys et al. [GEB15] proposed a method that changes the style of an image (content image)
to the style of another image (style image) while preserving the original content, e.g. they
transformed still images to have the characteristics of famous paintings. The concept of
this approach is to transform both input images into a content and a style space and to find
an image that is close to the content image in content space and close to the style image
in style space. Both spaces are defined by feature maps of a neural network. In contrast to
Gatys et al., we do not want to transfer an image to a target style, but want the style of our
image being similar to the styles of two different face images. For this purpose, we define
our target style as average style of both input face images that are used for the creation of
a morph, see Fig.2.
Mathematical Model for Style Transfer The content of an image is defined as vector-
ized feature maps F lj ∈ RMl of selected layers in the neural networks and the style of an
image as Gram matrices Gl ∈ RNl×Nl of F l , with Nl being the number of features maps
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in layer l and Ml the number of pixels of a feature map in layer l. The element Gli, j of
the Gram matrix is the inner product of the vectorized feature map i and j in layer l:
Gli, j = F
l
i (F
l
j )
T. In order to transform the style of an image, we look for an image I that
minimizes the loss function
L(I) =∑
l
vlC(I)l +∑
l
wlS(I)l ,
where Cl and Sl are the content and style loss (the weighted square difference of the con-
tent/style of I and the target content/style) of layer l and vl and wl are weights for the
content and style loss.
We use a VGG-19 network trained for object recognition to calculate the feature maps
and minimize L(I) using the gradient based Limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno algorithm with box constraints (L-BFGS-B) [Zh97] to create a new morph with
the style characteristics of the original image. Style transfer can handle images of any size,
since only the convolutional layers of the neural network are used and no fixed size for the
feature maps are needed.
Improving Blended Faces Using Style Transfer Before extracting the style from our
genuine input images, we align and crop the inner part of the face, see Fig.3a. The style is
extracted as described above for both images and finally averaged to get a target style, see
Fig.2. The content is provided by cropping the same region of the aligned and blended
face image. We initialize the L-BFGS-B algorithm with the simple blended image and use
the layers ’conv1 2’, ’conv2 2’, ’conv3 4’, ’conv4 4’, ’conv5 4’ for the content represen-
tation and ’conv1 1’, ’conv2 1’, ’conv3 1’, ’conv4 1’, ’conv5 1’ for the style representa-
tion.
Fig.3 shows examples for different means of image quality improvement of morphs.
Fig.3b shows the style transfer based improved version of the simple morph shown
in Fig.3a. The differences between the improved and simple version are visualized in
Fig.3c. Fine structures on the skin and features like moles are enhanced and edges that
are smoothed due to the blending, e.g. in and around the eyes, are reinforced to look
sharp again, see Fig.3d. Fig.3e and Fig.3f show the results of other means of post-
processing that aim to recover the sharpness of the original images. Fig.3e shows the
result of sharpening the image using unsharp masking and Fig.3e the image after trans-
forming the intensity of the simple morph so that its histogram approximately matches the
histogram of one of the input images used for this morph.
3 Experimental Setup
Morphed Face Image Generation and Improvement For the generation of our morphs,
we use the all-automatic face morphing pipeline in [Se17]. The factor for the geometry
warping and the morphing factor for the blending of the images was set to 0.5 for the gen-
eration of the morphed images. We apply the improvement of the morphs on the simple
blended face images before the seamless region cloning is applied (see [Se17]).
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(a) simple morph (b) style transfer (c) difference image (d)
(e) histogram equalization (f) sharpening filter (g)
Fig. 3: Examples of different means for the image quality improvement of morphs: (c) shows differ-
ence image between (a) and (b) with enhanced contrast, (d) enlarged part of (a) and (b), (g) enlarged
part of (e) and (f)
Face Image Collection and Pre-processing We collected face images from different
publicly available datasets4 and from our internal face databases. In total, we use about
2,000 face images in our experiments, after removing images with bad quality or vio-
lating requirements for passports, e.g. without frontal view. We split these genuine face
images into a training dataset including 70% of all images, test dataset (20%) and valida-
tion dataset (10%) to avoid overfitting of our detectors based on neural networks. When
selecting pairs for the generation of morphs, we ensure that both subjects have the same
gender, are from the same database and are used equally frequent.
We process all images to have a standardized region and size for the detectors as in
[RRB16, Ra17, Se18]. We rotate each image such that the eyes are on a horizontal line
and crop the smallest bounding box that includes mouth and eyebrows. Finally, this region
is scaled to 224x224 pixels.
4 BU-4DFE, Chicago Face Database, FERET, LondonFace Database, PUT, scFace, Utrecht, CyberExtruder Ul-
timate Face Matching Data Set
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Face Morphing Detectors In our study, we analyze five different MAD systems. In the
following, a short overview on these detectors is provided.
The image degeneration based MAD system presented in [Kr17] relies on the number
of edge describing features that are detected in an image and the change of the amount
of these features after compression. The classification is performed using a pruned C4.5
decision tree.
One detector presented in [RRB16] is based on Local Binary Patterns (LBP). The his-
togram of the 59 uniform local binary pattern is calculated to extract features and a support-
vector machine is used for classification.
A second detector proposed in [RRB16] is based on Binarized Statistical Image Features
(BSIF) with a filter size of 11× 11 and a bit length of 12. The histogram of the resulting
image with 12-bit depth is calculated and a support-vector machine is employed to obtain
a classifier.
Two MAD systems based on deep neural networks [Se18] use the VGG19-architecture and
start the training with on object classification pretrained DNNs. One network is directly
trained on genuine images vs. morphed faces (DNN naive), while the other network (DNN
MC) is first pretrained on partial morphs.
4 Results
Experimental Goals We define three goals to study the quality of our style transfer
based morph improvement approach and its effects on MAD systems.
(G1.1): We analyze whether the MAD systems can abstract from simple morphs and also
detect the improved morphs. We train the five described detection systems on genuine im-
ages and simple (not improved) morphs and test them on genuine images, simple morphs
and different kinds of improved morphs.
(G1.2): We study if the MAD systems can be adapted to robustly detect our style transfer
based improved morphs by replacing half of the morphs during the training by these im-
proved morphs.
(G2): We analyse the biometric quality of the improved morphs in terms of realistic morph
acceptance rate (rMAR) [Hi17] and morph acceptance rate (MAR) using a biometric ver-
ification system5. We set the threshold for this system such that we have a FAR of 0.1%
(according to the vendor specification) as recommended by FRONTEX for automated bor-
der control [FR15] and a even more strict rate of 0.01%.
Evaluation Metrics We consider face morphing attack detection as kind of presentation
attack detection (PAD) and use the PAD metrics bona fide presentation classification er-
ror rate (BPCER) and attack presentation classification error rate (APCER), which are
defined in ISO/IEC 30107-3 [In17]. Tab.1a and Tab.2a show the performance of the
5 Verilook 10.0/MegaMatcher 10.0 Faces Identification Thechnology Algorithm Demo
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studied MAD systems in BPCER and APCER, separated by the kind of improvement that
is applied to the morphs. In addition to the not post-processed morphs (simple) and our
presented improvement method (improved), we use a sharpening filter (sharp), which uses
the unsharp masking technique, histogram equalization (HEQU), and histgram equaliza-
tion after our syle transfer based method (imp.+HEQU) as post-processing steps to im-
prove the quality of our morphs. Tab.1b and Tab.2b show the BPCER at different fixed
APCER for the MAD systems that allow an adjustment of the error rates by changing the
decision threshold.
APCER(%)
Detector BPCER(%) simple improved sharp HEQU imp. + HEQU
Features [Kr17] 32.6 17.3 54.6 43.6 49.7 74.7
LBP [RRB16] 25.4 21.1 60.3 58.5 35.1 65.7
BSIF [RRB16] 13.3 17.3 54.9 39.4 24.7 63.1
DNN naive [Se18] 1.5 1.0 30.7 3.1 32.5 72.6
DNN complex MC [Se18] 1.5 0.5 27.1 2.6 29.1 62.9
a) BPCER and APCER at default threshold of the MAD systems
BPCER(%) at fixed APCER
Detector APCER(%) simple improved sharp HEQU imp. + HEQU
LBP [RRB16] 10.0 40.5 82.3 69.2 55.4 83.9
5.0 54.4 90.0 82.8 67.7 90.3
1.0 79.5 95.6 95.9 91.3 97.2
BSIF [RRB16] 10.0 24.1 72.6 46.9 33.9 75.4
5.0 35.9 78.5 67.2 46.7 85.1
1.0 78.5 88.7 89.2 74.4 93.3
DNN naive [Se18] 10.0 0.5 15.4 0.5 29.7 74.9
5.0 0.5 26.9 1.3 45.4 83.9
1.0 1.5 46.7 7.7 81.0 95.4
DNN complex MC [Se18] 10.0 0.3 7.2 0.3 26.9 61.8
5.0 0.3 16.4 0.8 51.3 84.4
1.0 1.0 38.5 2.3 93.8 98.5
b) BPCER at different fixed APCER
Tab. 1: G1.1 Performance of different MAD systems trained on simple morphs and genuine images
All detectors that are trained on genuine images and simple morphs only, performed worse
in detecting style transfer based improved morphs and even worse on style transfer based
improved and histogram equalized morphs. The APCER increases up to more than 62%
for all detectors. The Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves in Fig.4 show that this is
not only a matter of threshold of the classifier, but for any given APCER the BPCER is
always much worse for style transfer and histogram equalized improved morphs (dashed
red line) than for simple morphs (dashed green line). The MAD systems based on DNNs
show the worst absolute and relative loss of performance, while all other methods also
perform extremely poor on style transfer based and histogram equalized improved face
morphs.
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Including the style transfer based improved morphs in our training data, increases the
detection rate of all kinds of improved morphs for all detectors. The detection rate of the
style transfer based improved and histogram equalized morphs increases also for nearly all
detectors. The detectors adapted differently to this new kind of morph, while the detection
systems that are most vulnerable to improvement methods (the DNNs) can best adapt. The
DET curves for the detection of simple morphs (solid green line) of the MAD systems
that were trained with also on style transfer based improved morphs are slightly worse
for all but the BSIF, but for other means of attacks (solid red for style transfer based and
histogram equalized morphs and solid black for all mentioned attacks) far better.
Tab.3 shows that our improvement method slightly worsens the biometric quality of the
morphed faces, but we still have very high realistic morphing acceptance rates (rMAR)[Hi17].
APCER(%)
Detector BPCER(%) simple improved sharp HEQU imp. + HEQU
Features [Kr17] 33.8 17.3 43.6 30.7 50.0 72.2
LBP [RRB16] 32.6 25.8 38.4 50.5 33.8 43.0
BSIF [RRB16] 17.4 10.6 31.7 34.8 19.6 38.7
DNN naive [Se18] 1.5 2.8 7.2 4.4 15.7 29.9
DNN complex MC [Se18] 1.8 1.8 3.4 2.1 9.3 6.4
a) BPCER and APCER at default threshold of the MAD systems
BPCER(%) at fixed APCER
Detector APCER(%) simple improved sharp HEQU imp. + HEQU
LBP [RRB16] 10.0 49.2 62.8 74.4 59.0 70.5
5.0 56.2 75.4 81.5 77.7 81.0
1.0 84.9 87.4 89.2 89.2 89.2
BSIF [RRB16] 10.0 19.2 44.9 47.2 28.7 55.6
5.0 32.1 63.3 64.1 49.7 70.8
1.0 67.4 82.6 79.0 70.0 86.2
DNN naive [Se18] 10.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 6.9 11.3
5.0 1.0 4.4 1.3 11.8 26.4
1.0 7.7 11.0 10.3 50.0 60.8
DNN complex MC [Se18] 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.8
5.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 4.4 3.3
1.0 1.8 3.6 3.8 21.0 28.5
b) BPCER at different fixed APCER
Tab. 2: G1.2 Performance of different MAD systems trained on improved morphs, simple morphs
and genuine images
5 Summary and Discussion
We introduced a method that improves the quality of morphs to be a step ahead of the at-
tacker and analyze a broader range of attacks. The performance of different MAD systems
drop significantly when they are first confronted with our style transfer based improved
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Fig. 4: DET curve of the different detectors. Since the Feature-based detector uses a classification
tree, no DET curve was calculated.
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Morph type rMAR1000 rMAR10000 MAR1000 MAR10000
Simple Morphs 96.0% 90.5% 98.0% 95.3%
Improved Morphs 93.2% 87.0% 96.6% 93.4%
Sharp 95.5% 90.6% 97.8% 95.3%
HEQU 95.5% 90.5% 97.7% 95.2%
Imp.+HEQU 92.9% 86.5% 96.4% 93.1%
Tab. 3: G2 Biometric evaluation of improved morphs in comparison with simple morphs
morphs. After including our improved morphs in the training data, most of the MAD sys-
tems get significantly better in detecting them. They are also able to generalize and the
detection rate for other means of post-processing that improve the image quality also in-
creases. We achieve the best detection rates for all means of quality improved morphs by
the MAD systems based on deep neural networks.
We studied the effects of image quality improvement on MAD systems that are based on
handcrafted and learned features and showed that they are sensitive to subtle changes of
the image. More sophisticated methods, which are based on physical models like reflection
analysis [SHE18] or on biometric comparisons [FFM18], might be more robust against
our improvements, since the reflections on the face and the biometric differences are only
changed slightly.
Our method for style transfer based improvement of morphs is easy to implement using
a deep learning framework and does not need special or expensive resources. Hence, it is
a realistic scenario that an attacker would try to improve morphs using style transfer and
thus it should be considered in the evaluation of MAD systems.
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